BakerRisk’s fire and gas detection mapping software.
Fire and Gas Detection Mapping Software
Our consultants perform fire and gas detection mapping to ensure that releases at your facility are detected early to prevent escalation. Our professionals have the expertise to guide you towards ISA 84 TR7 compliance using BakerRisk’s unique Fire and Gas Tool (F>ool©) software. Using F>ool©, our consultants develop a detailed and defensible layout for fire, flammable gas, toxic gas, and acoustic detectors to detect potential releases within a process area at your facility.
Historical data, as well as field testing performed by BakerRisk, is incorporated into F>ool© to calculate and design precise coverage for your facility.
3D detection of each detector shown providing comprehensive detection
F&G Detector Coverage for F>ool©
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The webinar will highlight the release of our new best practice, “F&G Detector Mapping,” during which our experts will discuss the importance of incorporating fire & gas detection systems capable of detecting gas leaks, fires, and related hazards to reduce and mitigate risks at operating facilities.
Historically, the placement of fire and gas detectors has been based on experience and judgment.
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) is an extremely powerful tool to help one objectively assess the risk of complex processes. Most processes that use Highly Toxic Materials (HTMs) are complicated and pose hazards both to the employees on site and, in many cases, to the neighbouring offsite community. Understanding the risk associated with these HTM processes is often complicated due to the many risk mitigation systems that may be employed by the operator to control the hazards. Companies often conduct QRA studies to evaluate the potential risk exposures to their employees and neighbouring communities and, in some cases, to satisfy regulatory requirements. Regulatory bodies increasingly scrutinise QRA studies as part of their determination on the tolerability of risk posed by facilities processing HTMs.
A natural gas fired industrial oven exploded during an attempted restart a few hours after a cold start. The explosion was caused by accumulation of natural gas during the hours preceding the restart. The oven had a fully-automated control system, and the start, shutdown, and restart were controlled by process controls and a flame safeguard system. A malfunction of the flame detector allowed the automated controls to complete the start sequence and establish normal operating status without a flame present in the burner. The UV flame sensor gave a false positive signal, which allowed unburned natural gas to enter the oven. The investigation explored the cause of the incident and the failure modes of the flame detector.
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