Many worksites and industrial facilities have inherent fire and explosion hazards. We are here to help you identify, analyze, and mitigate those internal explosion hazards for your facilities. BakerRisk’s team of explosion experts and industry-experienced specialists can work with you to evaluate and implement upgrades to existing structures, design new structures, test existing designs, and ultimately ensure the safety of worksite personnel from fire and explosion hazards.
Fire and Explosion Protection Services
BakerRisk’s fire and explosion protection experts are well-equipped to maximize facility safety, no matter what specific services you may require, and we always follow industry best practices. We help you analyze and mitigate fire and explosion hazards with services such as:
Our Contributions
Our involvement with the standards developed by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Explosion Protection Committee goes well beyond participation on the committee. We have contributed critical test data that has been leveraged by the Explosion Protection Committee over the past two decades to improve and validate the correlations within the relevant NFPA standards. Due to active involvement in this committee, our professionals have developed an intimate understanding of the tools and techniques available for analyzing internal explosion hazards.
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Related Resources
The biggest industrial explosions in history are valuable learning tools. Here are some of BakerRisk’s takeaways from historic industrial disasters.
Our team will be presenting the following topics at the Virtual Texas/Louisiana EHS Seminar, June 7 & 8, 2021.
The October 2019 edition of the Institution of Chemical Engineer’s (IChemE) Loss Prevention Bulletin features a BakerRisk case study on the Caribbean Petroleum Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE).
Shock wave attenuation in a straight tunnel (or pipe) can be evaluated using existing methodologies. Shock attenuation is enhanced when there are right-angle turns along the length of the tunnel over which the shock is transmitted. A repeated set of such turns is generally defined as a blast trap. Little guidance is available in the open literature regarding the blast attenuation enhancement due to a right-angle turn or a blast trap in a tunnel. This paper presents guidance for shock wave attenuation as a function of the number of right-angle turns and blast wave parameters (i.e., peak pressure and duration). Characteristic parameters are utilized in order to define shock wave properties and tunnel dimensions. The shock attenuation due to up to four consecutive right-angle turns is evaluated. The purpose of this work is to provide a database of the shock attenuation within a tunnel due to multiple right-angle turns for use in designing tunnel structural components and evaluating the response of such components to postulated transmitted shock loads.
Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc. (BakerRisk®) and Daewoo Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. (Daewoo) performed vented (i.e., partially-confined) vapor cloud explosion (VCE) tests with both propane and lean hydrogen mixtures. BakerRisk’s Deflagration Load Generator (DLG) test rig was used to perform the tests. The DLG test rig was designed primarily to produce centrally-peaked blast waves that are representative of VCEs suitable for blast loading test articles, but has also been used for vented deflagration testing. The DLG test rig is a steel box with one open side, measuring 48 ft. long by 24 ft. deep by 12 ft. high (14.6 m by 7.3 m by 3.7 m). The DLG test rig is outfitted with congestion, filled with the desired fuel-air mixture, and then ignited near the center of the rear wall.
Estimating pressure rise due to deflagration in a fully or partially confined space is of practical importance in safety design of a petrochemical plant. Herein, we have developed a new theoretical model to predict the pressure rise due to deflagration in both fully and partially confined spaces. First, the theoretical model was compared and validated against experimental data from the closed-space experiments with hydrogen, methane, propane, and ethane. The theory predicted accurate pressure rises near the stoichiometric regime for all fuel types; outside the stoichiometric regime, especially, for rich mixtures of hydrocarbons with air, the theory over-predicted pressure rise since it does not account for soot formation and the associated energy losses by radiation. Experimental investigation of propane and hydrogen deflagration was conducted in a partially confined space and the theory-based predictions agreed with the data up to 5%. Parametric numerical study was performed to investigate the effect of the initial pressure and temperature of gaseous fuels on pressure rise.
This paper presents results from a test program carried out to determine the peak deflagration pressure achieved within a congested enclosure vented through one wall of the enclosure. The industry standard in the United States for predicting the peak pressure developed in a vented deflagration is the National Fire Protection Association's Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting (NFPA 68). The NFPA Explosion Protection Committee has compiled a database of published and unpublished explosion venting test data. This data was summarized in a 2008 report (Zalosh) that served as the foundation of the development for the vented deflagration correlations in the latest (2013) edition of NFPA 68. In this latest edition, NFPA 68 (2013), the vent area correlation accounts for varying degrees of congestion if the ratio of the obstacle surface area (Aobs) to that of the enclosure internal surface area (As) is greater than 0.4 (i.e., Ar ¼ Aobs/As > 0.4). Congestion is accounted for within the correlation at all values of Ar, however when Ar is < 0.4, variations in the level of congestion are not accounted for. The tests described in this paper were performed using an obstacle array with an Ar ratio of less than 0.4.
A set of large-scale vented deflagration tests involving methane- and propane-air mixtures in a congested enclosure has been performed. The enclosure utilized had a 24-foot by 24-foot footprint and a height of 6 feet. Steel plates were attached to the roof and all four sides served as vents. The vent panels weighed 2 lbm/ft2 and were configured to release at 0.3 psig. A regular array of vertical circular tubes provided the congestion for these tests. The tubes were arranged with a pitch-to-diameter ratio of 7.6 and provided area and volume blockage ratios of 13% and 1.5%, respectively. The fuel-air mixture completely filled the congested region in these tests, but did not extend beyond it. The average peak pressures achieved with methane and propane mixtures were 4.0 psig and 5.0 psig, respectively. These pressures are 20 to 40 times the values predicted by the NFPA 68 weak and strong enclosure correlations, respectively, if the constraint imposed by the vent panel release pressure is not explicitly considered. Consideration of the vent panel release pressure constraint increases the predicted pressures to within an order of magnitude of the measured values. On the basis of these tests, it is concluded that NFPA 68 correlations can significantly underpredict the peak pressure achieved in a vented deflagration for an enclosure with moderate congestion levels. This paper also provides comparisons with a simplified predictive method currently under development.
Gaseous explosions occurring in industrial piping and process systems have been recorded and documented since the early days of industrialization. Despite the efforts put forth by the academic and scientific communities in understanding these phenomena, these explosions are still occurring in industry. Often times, operating companies that suffered the explosions were unaware of the possibilities of explosion in their piping systems and as a result, installed control and safety systems were not adequate. The mitigation of gaseous explosions in pipes requires a basic understanding of combustion and detonation theory. These events are not confined to chemical and petroleum refining facilities; potentially, they can occur in any system where a flammable mixture can form in pipes.
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